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Abstract—In this paper we propose a new framework able
to ensure security, multimedia quality and energy efficiency in
Multimedia Wireless Sensor Networks (MWSNs). The energy is
an important and limited resource, which has a direct impact on
the lifetime of nodes in MWSNs. In addition, the characteristics
of MWSNs like the limited bandwidth and non-deterministic
channel access have a significant impact on the QoS of multimedia
traffic. We propose the Efficient Dynamic Selective Encryption
Framework (EDES) in order to reduce the energy consumption
and increase the QoS while ensuring a secure multimedia traffic.
EDES proposes three security levels (high, medium and low)
and the selection of each level depends on the energy and QoS
parameters. Moreover, the cross-layer approach is selected for
EDES to take into account the different parameters at physical,
MAC and upper layers. The capacity metric is proposed to
evaluate the possibility to increase or decrease the security level.
The simulation results illustrate the importance of the security
level adaptation according to the QoS and the energy parameters.
EDES increases the lifetime duration of nodes by almost 40%
compared to static encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Multimedia Wireless Sensor Networks (MWSNs) have
gained the interest of researchers and industrials, because of
their large applications. Unlike the Wireless Scalar Sensor
Networks (WSSNs), MWSNs offer new network services like
video and audio communications. The application fields of
MWSN are mainly related to security such as: video surveil-
lance, people or objects tracking, border monitoring, etc [1][2].
Therefore, these applications require security services like
the end-to-end data confidentiality between the multimedia
sensors and the server (sink), the mutual authentication, and
the data integrity. However, the characteristics of MWSNs
such as: the limited resources (bandwidth, energy, memory
and processing), the wireless link and mobility make the
proposition of an efficient security solution a real challenge.
Many solutions proposed to secure both WSSNs and MWSNs
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are mainly based on static public or symmetric cryptography
algorithms [3]. In the case of public cryptography the Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) implemented in hardware [4] or
software [5] is used. However, in the case of symmetric cryp-
tography, the Tesla and micro Tesla [6] are used. Most security
solutions proposed for MWSNs do not only encounter the
energy constraint but also the QoS constraints. We know that
the security cost can directly impact the network performance
and QoS. For instance, when the size of packets increases
because of the addition of security information like numerical
packet signature, the data throughput of data decreases.
Unlike existing works, which focus on security, QoS and
energy separately, we introduce in this work the security of the
multimedia traffic while taking into account QoS and energy.
We propose a new framework called EDES able to adapt
the security levels according to QoS and energy parameters.
The basic idea of EDES is to improve security in terms of
robustness without negatively impacting the QoS and lifetime
of sensors. We introduce a new metric called capacity to
assess the available resources in terms of throughput, delay,
link quality and energy. The cross-layer approach is selected
to correctly evaluate the different parameters at different
layers. Moreover, the different types of video frames do not
have the same importance. The compression exploits temporal
and spatial correlations in an image sequence, so there is a
dependency between frames created by the inter-frame coding.
Inter-frame coding uses motion estimation and compensation
between successive video frames. For instance, in the case of
MPEG4 codec the frame types P and B need the adjacent
frame I and frame P respectively in order to be correctly
decoded. In other words, it is not possible to rebuild frames
P and B without the data in frames I and P respectively.
Therefore, the frame types significance is not the same. That
is why, we use in this work the selective encryption process
to differentiate between different frames.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2,
we present the summarization of the existing works related
to security and encryption in MWSNs. Section 3 presents
our proposed solution Efficient Dynamic Selective Encryption
Framework (EDES). The fourth section is dedicated to the
results obtained with the simulators and their analysis. Finally,
section 5 concludes the paper and presents our future works.
II. RELATED WORKS
Recent works dealing with Quality of Service (QoS) in
MWSNs are mainly focused on the QoS maximization and
energy consumption minimization. Kandris et al. [7] proposed
a scheme called PEMuR which aims at saving energy and
maximizing the QoS rate for an efficient video communi-
cation. PEMuR proposes the combined use of an energy
aware hierarchical routing protocol with an intelligent video
packet scheduling algorithm. This algorithm may cope with
limited available channel bandwidth by selectively dropping
less significant packets prior to their transmission. Another
work proposed by Cobo et al. [8] dealt with the QoS routing
model for Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks (WMSN).
The proposed solution called AntSensNet is based on the
traditional ant-based algorithm and multi-QoS routing metric.
However, these solutions did not deal with security issues.
Other proposed solutions dealt with security in the case of
low-power computing and communication devices by using a
selective encryption concept. The idea of selective encryption
is to encrypt chosen units of message while leaving the remain-
ing units unencrypted. This concept was introduced by Spanos
and Maples in [9]. Meyer and Gadegast [10] propose to reduce
the amount of encrypted MPEG data in a video sequence while
at the same time providing an acceptable level of security.
However, these works did not take into account the con-
straints of Multimedia Wireless Sensor Networks (MWSNs).
In addition, main works on selective encryption focused on
performance issues and not on security issues. That is why,
Lundin and Lindskog have evaluated the security impact of
the selective encryption by using the entropy and guesswork
[11]. In this work, we combine between opposite QoS and
security parameters with energy consumption consideration.
III. EFFICIENT DYNAMIC SELECTIVE ENCRYPTION
FRAMEWORK
The Efficient Dynamic Selective Encryption framework
(EDES) is based on two main steps. The first step consists
in assessing the network performance parameters. We intro-
duce the new capacity function called CAP . This function
combines between QoS parameters and residual energy. The
QoS parameters consist of the throughput, delay and link
quality. In order to assess these parameters, we select the
cross-layer approach which is able to deal with MAC, routing
and other upper layers parameters. The second step consists
in selecting a security level and using or not the selective
encryption algorithm. The security level is selected according
to the CAP function. The capacity function allows to evaluate
the resources availability at the transmitter camera sensor node
and it is based on four parameters: the throughput, the delay,
the link quality index (LQI) and the residual energy. The
throughput and the delay are the most important parameters
for multimedia traffic. We know that this kind of traffic needs
an important throughput and minimum delay. The strategy of
CAP function is summarized as follows:
• Maximize the residual energy of the camera sensor (RE)
• Maximize the throughput
• Maximize the Link Quality Index (LQI)
• Minimize the delay
The CAP function between two nodes i and j can be
expressed according to the chosen QoS metrics:
CAPi,j =
∑
k
ck × fk(x
k
ij) (1)
where xkij is the value of metric k relatively to the link
between two nodes i and j, ck is the preference weight of
metric k with
∑
k ck = 1, and fk(:) is a normalized func-
tion. xkij presents the following QoS parameters: Throughput,
Delay, Link quality and Residual energy. The choice of the
weights ci depends on the application and the type of traffic
(the delay is more important than the loss rate for streaming).
CAP function introduces four formalized functions fk(:).
The normalized function is introduced to express different
characteristics of different units with a comparable numerical
representation. The most commonly used normalized functions
are the sigmoidal (S-shaped) functions. Indeed, sigmoidal
functions are well-known functions often used to describe QoS
perception [12]. We consider the following analytic expression
for the sigmoid form:
f(x) =
(x− xm)
ζ
1 + (x − xm)ζ
(2)
where xm > 0 and ζ ≥ 2 are tunable parameters, according
to which different users’ utilities are differentiated.
EDES defines three security levels: low, medium and high.
The low security enables the receiver nodes to control the data
integrity and the sender authentication by using the Hashed-
based Message Authentication Code (HMAC). However, this
level does not ensure the data confidentiality. The medium
level has the same security services as low level and ensures
data confidentiality by using Standard (AES) algorithm. If the
network traffic requires confidentiality, EDES chooses whether
the medium or the high security level according to the network
status. In this work, we did not focus on the cryptographic
keys distribution. In MWSNs the camera sensors send the data
to the sink node (Many-to-one communication). We assume
that the multimedia sensor nodes shared secret keys with the
sink node and all known nodes shared the secret group key
[13]. The difference between the high and medium security
levels is the percentage of encryption which is higher than
%Thhigh in the case of a high security level. In addition,
EDES differentiates between the frame types in order to select
the important frame called key-frame (ie. frame I in the case
of MPEG-4 codec). The percentage of encryption in the case
of I frame is not the same for other frames. In this work,
we consider two types of video codecs: MPEG4 and H263. In
both codecs, I and PB frames are important frames in MPEG4
Fig. 1. Flowchart of EDES at the Sender node
and H263 respectively and the percentage of their encryption
is EncI . The encryption percentage of other frames depends
on EncI and their computing is given as fellows:
In the case of MPEG 4 video coding:{
P − frame Encryption = EncP = CP ∗ EncI
B − frame Encryption = EncB = CB ∗ EncI
In case of h263 video coding:{
P − frame Encryption = EncP = EncI
PB − frame Encryption = EncPB = CPB ∗ EncP
Where CP , CB and CPB are coefficients of importance
of P, B and PB frames compared to I frames. In the case
of H263 the frame P has the same importance as frame I
(EncI = EncP ). In order to switch between three security
levels, we define three CAP thresholds values. The high
security level needs a sufficient network performance and
residual energy. The medium security level is an intermediate
level which enables to ensure the confidentiality with an
acceptable resource consumption. Without enough resource
availability the minimum security is ensured by the low level.
The following equation defines the switching between different
security levels:

if(CAP ≥ %Thhigh) EncI = %Thhigh
if(%Thmin ≤ CAP ≤ %Thhigh) EncI = 50%
if(CAP ≤ %Thmin) EncI = 0%
where Thhigh and Thmin can be tuned according to wireless
nodes technologies and the desirable security.
EDES framework can be summarized into two flowcharts
illustrated in figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the set of
operations executed by the sender. The CAP function assesses
the resource availability in terms of network performance
parameters and residual energy. If the network traffic needs
Fig. 2. Flowchart of EDES at the Receiver node
confidentiality, the low security level is discarded. The specific
operations are launched according to the selected security
level. In the case of low security level the information related
to data integrity and authentication is added by using two
HMAC: first one is based on group key (KG) for the relayed
nodes and and the second one is based on the key shared by
the sensor camera and the sink node (KER). The key group
enables the relayed node to check if the packet is generated by
authorized network member nodes and the data integrity. This
HMAC is changed at each hop in order to check each relayed
node. This is a common operation between the different
security levels. However, in the case of high and medium
security levels, the frame study and encryption percentage of
each type of frame is specified. Moreover, information (M)
is added to indicate if the packet is encrypted or not. The
selective encryption is carried out according to the chosen
%EncI of each frame. Finally the digital packet signature
is added for authentication and data integrity.
Figure 2 shows the flowchart at the receiver node (sink or
relayed node). When the relayed node receives the packet, it
checks the HMAC associated with the packet. If it is correct,
the packet is relayed or generated by an authenticated node
using KG. If the receiver is the sink node, it checks the HMAC
by using the secret shared key (KER) before the decryption
process. If the operation is succeeds the decryption process is
applied.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the performance of EDES, we simulate
the proposed selective encryption algorithms and CAP func-
tion by using NS2 [14] and Mica2dot characteristics platform
[15]. We used two different video codecs: MPEG4 with low
quality and H263 with 16kbps rate. The basic difference
between both video codecs is that in MPEG4 coding all the
important information are in the I-frame, for example the
average of I-frames is 7000 bytes, whereas the average size of
P-frames is 300 bytes and less than 100 bytes for B-frames.
TABLE I
NS2 SIMULATION PARAMETERS
MAC/Physical Technology IEEE802.15.4
Packet size 127 Bytes
Thmin/Thhigh 20 / 60
CP / CB / CPB 0.5 / 0.5 / 0.5
Number of mobile nodes 25
Routing protocol AODV
CBR/VBR rates 16kb/s
Maximum throughput 150Kbps
Simulation time 100s
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Fig. 3. CAP versus Residual energy
However, with H263 there is only one I-frame (the first one)
then the frame’s size is distributed between PB-frames and B-
frames and the PB-frames are more frequent than the I-frames
in MPEG4. Moreover, the simulation parameters are presented
in Table I.
A. CAP function performance
The obtained simulation results are plotted in Figure 3
which shows the CAP function behavior with different param-
eters such as: the residual energy, throughput and link quality.
We remark that the high security level is reached when both
parameters: throughput and residual energy are high otherwise
the medium security level depends on the selected Thmin.
B. Evaluation of Security
In order to evaluate the security aspect, we used SecV LC
tool [16]. We select a video with a high rate of movement
as testbed in order to evaluate the performance of EDES in
terms of security, energy consumption and network lifetime.
MSU Video Quality Measurement Tool (MSU VQMT) [17] is
used to analyse the quality of different videos. This application
enables to carry out an objective comparison of the different
video codecs and to perform filters in the video analysis.
We used MSE (Mean Square Error) as metric to evaluate
the image quality. MSE measures the average of ”errors”
squares. It assesses the quality of an estimator according to
its variation. When MSE is low the loss of information for
a potential attacker is high. Figure 4 shows MSE versus
frames with different security levels. We remark that MSE
increases significantly between two frames encrypted with a
Fig. 4. MSE measure of the encrypted videos
Fig. 5. PSNR versus Security Levels
low-security and medium-security level. MSE is relatively
stable with EncI = 20%.
We used PSNR (Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio) [18] as an-
other metric in order to evaluate the power of signal and power
of corrupting the noise which affects the quality of video
representation. Typical values for the PSNR in lossy image
and video compression are between 30 and 50 dB, where
higher is better. Acceptable values for wireless transmission
quality loss are considered to be about 20 dB to 25 dB.
Figure 5 shows the average PSNR versus frames with
different security levels varying from highest EncI = 70%
to lowest EncI = 10%. We remark that the PSNR decreases
when the percentage of I-frame encryption increases. In the
case of EncI = 70% the PSNR is around 6.68db which is a
very low value. However, when EncI = 33% and 10% the
PSNR is 14.08dB and 17.99dB respectively which are high
values. Despite the low encryption percentage, the PSNR
does not exceed 18db which is lower than 20dB and 25dB.
C. Energy Saving Evaluation
We know that the cost of energy consumption by the cryp-
tography algorithms is inferior to the cost of radio communi-
cation [15]. The equations to compute the energy consumption
in the case of transmission and reception are as follows:{
ETx = Packetsize ∗ 59, 2µJoule
ERx = Packetsize ∗ 28, 6µJoule
where 28, 6µJoule is the cost of receiving one byte and
59, 2µJoule is the required cost to transmit one byte.
Fig. 6. Encryption Energy Consumption
Fig. 7. Encryption Energy comsumption for MPEG4 low quality video
Let’s consider the case of a sensor node using 2 × AA
batteries. That means that the initial battery of a sensor is
2 × 2700mAh. We know that 1wh = 3600joule, then the
initial energy expressed in joule is EInitial = 17820Joule.
Figure 6 illustrates the encryption energy consumption ver-
sus time with EDES and the classical encryption algorithm. We
remark that the energy consumption of EDES is significantly
inferior to and more stable than the classical encryption
algorithm. The high variation of energy consumption in the
case of the classical algorithm is mainly due to the encryption
of all frames because the frames size variation directly impacts
the energy consumption and it is not the case with EDES.
In order to evaluate EDES with both video codecs: MPEG4
and H263, we simulate EDES and the obtained results are
plotted in figure 7. We remark that using H263 video codec
with EDES increases the MWSN lifetime by around 50%
compared to MPEG4. We conclude that H263 is more adapted
to MWSNs characteristics. Moreover, EDES improves the life-
time by 40% compared to the classical encryption algorithm.
The reduction of energy consumption is more important at
the source node compared to the destination node, because
in MWSNs the destination node is the sink node (server).
Therefore, the impact at the receiver node can be neglected
in MWSNs.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new framework called Efficient
Dynamic Selective Encryption Framework (EDES) in order
to ensure dynamic security levels while taking into account
the network performance and the energy consumption. The
innovation of the proposed EDES consists in the combination
of QoS parameters and security levels. EDES proposes three
security levels (high, medium and low) with the ability to
ensure the authentication, the data integrity and the confi-
dentiality. The selection of each level depends on the energy
and QoS parameters. The capacity function is proposed to
evaluate the possibility to increase or decrease the security
level. The assessment of this function is based on the cross-
layer approach to take into account the different parameters
at physical, MAC and upper layers. The simulation results
illustrate that the security is ensured even with a low security
level. In addition, EDES increases the lifetime duration of
nodes by around 40% compared to the classical encryption
algorithm. In our future works, we plan to extend our study
to dynamic MWSNs by taking into account a new parameter:
mobility.
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